A workflow is resilient when the unavailability of some users does not force to choose between a violation of the security policy or an early termination of the workflow. Although checking for the resiliency of a workflow is a well-studied problem, solutions usually only provide a binary answer to the problem, leaving a workflow designer with little help when the workflow is not resilient. We propose in this paper to provide instead a measure of quantitative resiliency, indicating how much a workflow is likely to terminate for a given security policy and a given user availability model. We define this notion by encoding the resiliency problem as a decision problem, reducing the finding of an optimal user-task assignment to that of solving a Markov Decision Process. We illustrate the flexibility of our encoding by considering different measures of resiliency, and we empirically analyse them, showing the existence of a trade-off between multiple aspects such as success rate, expected termination step and computation time, thus providing a toolbox that could help a workflow designer to improve or fix a workflow. 
Introduction
A workflow is the automation of a business process comprising tasks and predicate conditions defining their partial order [1] . Ensuring all workflow instances complete means assigning each task to a user in accordance with business rules specifying when and by whom workflow data may be accessed and modified. From a security perspective, access management ensures users with the correct clearance and capabilities are matched with appropriate tasks while reducing the threat of collusion and fraud. Each user-task assignment may have to satisfy many different kind of security constraints [6, 7, 14] , the three most common being: i) the user must be authorised to perform the task; ii) if the task is related to another task through a binding of duty, then the same user should perform both tasks; iii) if the task is related to another task through a separation of duty, then the same user cannot perform both tasks.
The Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) [9, 23] therefore consists in finding a user-task assignment ensuring both the termination of all instances and the non-violation of the security constraints, especially in highly dynamic environments, subject to unpredictable events such as user unavailability. This can be an issue for dynamic workflow management systems whose choices made for early tasks can constrict later assignments [16] . In extreme cases, bad assignments will remove all assignment options for an upcoming task and block a workflow from completing [3, 15] . It is therefore important these workflows can be appraised before enactment via suitable tools and useable metrics that aid workflow configuration and formulation of contingency plans, such as resiliency [23] , which checks whether the unavailability of some users has an impact on satisfiability.
Most existing approaches, e.g. [11, 10, 13, 21, 23] , address the WSP from a computational point-of-view, by finding the most efficient algorithm to compute a suitable assignment, which either return a correct assignment if it exists, or nothing. In practice finding such an assignment can be demanding and often unmanageable, especially when facing unforeseen and emergency situations. For example, despite the provision of guidelines stipulating many public service staffing levels (e.g. [20] ), high sickness rates, budget cuts, staff shortage, increased workloads and unpredictability all contribute to critical workflows often being attempted without enough available users.
Taking a binary approach therefore fails to address a number of real-life issues where the ideal case is not always reachable. Indeed, declaring a workflow to be either resilient or not may be of little practical use to a workflow designer. Of course, a satisfiable workflow is always better than an unsatisfiable one but a workflow where all but one instance can be correctly assigned provides on average, a better service than one where no instance can be assigned. In addition, if both workflows terminate early instead of violating the policy, they are both better than a workflow violating the policy.
In this paper we take the stance to provide a workflow designer with quantitative measures, indicating a degree of satisfaction and/or resiliency for a given workflow, instead of simply returning an assignment if one exists. In order to do so, we propose to model the WSP as a decision problem, in order to benefit from the extensive collections of tools related to the discipline. More precisely, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
-We first encode the workflow satisfaction problem as finding the optimal solution of a Markov Decision Process (MDP); -We then encode the decremental resiliency problem [23] as an extension of the above one, by modelling user availability in the state of the MDP; -We illustrate the flexibility of our model by showing how a simple change of the reward function can move the focus from the normal termination rate of the workflow to the expected termination step, and we show on a simple use case that both approaches are in general incomparable, and that in general, finding the optimal assignment requires addressing a trade-off between multiple aspects, including computation time.
Is is important to note that the focus of this paper is not to provide a particularly efficient solution to the WSP, but to propose a novel approach of this problem.
We however believe our approach paves the way to defining an efficient solution by using the extensive literature dedicated to the efficient solving of an MDP. The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of related work while Section 3 revisits the workflow satisfiability problem and defines it as an MDP. In Section 4 we define quantitative measures for workflow satisfaction and resiliency. An assessment of our approach is given in Section 5 and concluding remarks in Section 6.
Related Work
A number of previous studies on workflow resiliency appear in the literature. Wang et al. took a first step in [23] to quantify resiliency by addressing the problem of whether a workflow can still complete in the absence of users and defined a workflow as k resilient to all failures of up to k users across an entire workflow. Lowalekar et al. show in [17] multiple assignments may provide the same level of k resiliency and give a technique for selecting the most favourable using security attributes that minimize the diffusion of business knowledge across all users.
Basin et al. in [3, 4] allow the reallocation of roles to users thus overcoming workflow blocks created by user failure. This is feasible in certain business domains but may have limited application in public service workflows where roles are more specialised; a nurse cannot step in for a doctor for example. Wainer et al. consider in [22] the explicit overriding of security constraints in workflows, by defining a notion of privilege. Similarly, Bakkali [2] suggests introducing resiliency through delegation and the placement of criticality values over workflows. Delegates are chosen on their suitability but may lack competence; this is considered the 'price to pay' for resiliency. As delegation takes place at a task level it is not currently clear whether a workflow can still complete while meeting security constraints.
A more practical approach is presented by Mace et al. [18] and more formally by Watson [24] who discuss the practicalities of assigning workflows, or parts of workflow across multiple cloud-based platforms while ensuring security constraints are met. Discussion is given on the various trade-offs that must be considered including performance and security risks. Current literature does not address the issue of workflows that must execute but may not be satisfiable nor resilient in every instance. Neither does it provide quantitative measures to analyse and optimise workflows in such cases, which is the focus of this paper.
The Workflow Satisfiability Problem
In a nutshell, the Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) [23] consists in assigning each user to a task for a given workflow such that all security constraints are met. Whereas existing work mostly considers WSP as a constraint solving problem (for instance as the graph k-colouring problem when the workflow contains separation of duties constraints [23, 4] ), we propose to consider it as a a1 a2 a3 a4 t1 u1 u2 u2 u2 t2 u2 u2 u2 u3 t3 u3 u1 u3 u1 [5] . We first propose a definition of workflow, which, although driven by the MDP encoding, is general enough to consider complex workflows. After briefly recalling the notion of MDP, we then present the corresponding MDP encoding and the definition of the WSP.
Workflow
As described in Section 2, there exist several definitions of workflow in the literature. They commonly define a set of users U and a set of tasks T , structured to indicate which sequences of tasks can be executed, for instance with a partial ordering over tasks. For the sake of generality, we consider a task manager, which is a function τ : T × U → P(T )
2 . In other words, given a task t and a user u, τ (t, u) is a probability function over tasks indicating the probability of each task to be the next one.
The set of tasks contains an initial task t 0 ∈ T , and in order to model the fact that a workflow can finish we consider a special task ⊥ t ∈ T , such that, given any user u, τ (⊥ t , u) = ⊥ t
3
Running example. As a running example to illustrate the different concepts presented here, we consider the workflow shown in Figure 1 where T = {t 1 , t 2 , t 3 } and where the only possible sequence is t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 . Hence, the initial task is t 1 , and the task manager is defined as, for any user u, τ (t 1 , u) = t 2 , τ (t 2 , u) = t 3 , and τ (t 3 , u) = ⊥ t .
The second common aspect of workflows across existing definitions is to define a set of users U coming with a security policy over the set of tasks T , including basic user permissions, separations and bindings of duties, expressed as sets of constraints. Hence, we consider security policies of the form p = (P, S, B) where -P ⊆ U × T are user-task permissions, such that (u, t) ∈ P if, and only if u is allowed to perform t;
-S ⊆ ℘(T ) 4 are separations of duty, such that {t 1 , . . . , t n } ∈ S if, and only if each user assigned to t i is distinct; -B ⊆ ℘(T ) are bindings of duty, such that {t 1 , . . . , t n } ∈ B if, and only if the same user is assigned to all t i ;
Running example. We now consider a set of users U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } and a security policy p 1 = (P 1 , S 1 , B 1 ) that states: Figure 1 illustrates this security policy, where a dotted arrow signifies a constraint given in p between the tasks t and t . A label [u m , ..., u n ] states the users that are authorised by P to execute t. A workflow therefore consists of both a set of tasks, with a task manager and a set of users, with a security policy.
Definition 1 (Workflow).
A workflow is a tuple W = (U, T , τ, t 0 , p), where U is a set of users, T is a set of tasks, τ is a task manager, t 0 is the initial task and p is a security policy.
Workflow assignment
A user-task assignment is a relation UA ⊆ U × T , associating each t i with some u i . Given a policy p = (P, S, B), UA satisfies p, and in this case, we write UA p, if, and only if the three following conditions are met:
In our running example, Table 1 provides all workflow assignments satisfying p 1 , such that each a i is represented as a function from task to users. For instance, a 2 assigns t 1 and t 2 to u 2 and t 3 to u 1 . An instance of a workflow is a sequence of tasks (t 1 , . . . , t n ) such that τ (t i , u, t i+1 ) = 0, for any i and any user u. Informally, the WSP consists of defining a relation UA such that, for any instance of a workflow, the restriction of UA to tasks in this instance satisfies the policy of the workflow.
In some cases, solving the WSP can be relatively simple. For instance, consider a policy where S = B = ∅, i.e., where there are no separations or bindings of duty. In this case, it is enough to assign each task t with a user u such that (u, t) ∈ P , and if there is no such user, then the workflow is unsatisfiable. However, the enforcement of separations and bindings of duty might require to keep track of the previous assignments. For instance, in our running example, u 1 can only be assigned to t 3 if it has not been assigned neither to t 2 nor to t 1 .
The task t3 cannot be executed.
The workflow terminates correctly.
Contextual Assignment
As illustrated above, in order to ensure that the security constraints are met, the user-task assignment needs to take into account at least the previous assignments. We call context any dynamic information relevant to user-task assignments, such as the security policy, the history of execution, or the user failures.
Here again, we aim for generality, and given a workflow W = (U, T , τ, t 0 , p), we consider a set C of contexts, with a context manager γ : C × T × U → P(C), such that given a context c, a task t and a user u, γ(c, t, u) represents the probability space of the next context. We write D = (C, γ, c 0 ) for a context description, which includes a set of contexts, a context manager and initial context c 0 ∈ C. For instance, in order to define the WSP, the context needs to contain all previous assignments, in order to check the validity of separations and bindings of duty at each step. Hence we define C h = ℘(U × T ), such that for any c ∈ C h , all (u, t) ∈ c correspond to previous assignments. We then define the context manager γ h as, for any context c ∈ C h , any task t and any user u, γ h (c, t, u) = c ∪ {(u, t)}. The assignment (u, t) is permitted if it satisfies p when combined with the previous assignments contained in c. Thus, for any context c ∈ C h we write c, u, t p if, and only if, c ∪ {(u, t)} p. We write D h = (C h , γ h , ∅) for the context description corresponding to previous assignments. In the following, we assume the sets U and T to be clear from context when using D h , unless stated otherwise.
Definition 2 (Assignment). Given a workflow W = (U, T , τ, t 0 , p) and a context description D = (C, γ, c 0 ), a contextual assignment is a function δ : C ×T → U, such that δ(c, t) represents the user assigned to t in the context c.
For instance, with the context description D h , a simple contextual assignment is to return any user that can execute the task, taking previous assignments into account. We define the set of all permitted users PU c,t = {u | c, u, t p}. The on-the-fly assignment is then the function δ o (c, t) returning any user from PU c,t , if it is not empty, and any user otherwise (meaning that no user can execute t in the context c without violating the workflow policy).
As illustrated on Figure 2 , where {u m , ..., u n } denotes PU c,t , δ o might not select the best possible assignment. For instance if u 1 is assigned to t 1 and u 3 is assigned to t 2 , which are both correct assignments in their respective context, then the separation of duty constraints make it impossible to assign t 3 to any user. However, as shown on Figure 3 , if u 2 is assigned to t 2 instead, then u 3 can be assigned to t 3 . We present in the next section the encoding of the workflow as an MDP, which aims at defining an assignment avoiding the above pitfall.
Markov Decision Process
In order to define the optimal contextual assignment, we encode the notion of assignment into a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [5] , which is a stochastic process where the transition from one state to another is governed both probabilistically and by a decision made by a policy. Each transition is associated with a reward, and solving an MDP consists in defining a policy maximising the expected reward collected by the process. More precisely, an MDP is a tuple (S, A, p, r) where:
-S is a set of states, describing the possible configurations of the system; -A is a set of actions, describing how to go from one state to another;
is a transition function, such that p a ss describes 5 the probability of reaching s from s when executing the action a; -r : S × A × S → R is a reward function, such that r a ss describes the reward associated with execution a from the state s and reaching s .
A policy for an MDP (which should not be confused with the security policy of a workflow) is a function δ : S → A, i.e., associating each state with an action, and the value of a policy for an MDP is given as:
where 0 ≤ β < 1 is a discount factor, giving more or less weight to "future" values. The optimal policy is then defined as:
where V * is the value function of δ * . Note that since β < 1, the optimal policy is always defined, even when s = s . It is possible to show that V * (s) ≥ V δ (s), for any other policy δ and any state s, and we refer to [5] for further details about the proof of this property and further details on the notion of MDP.
In order to reduce the WSP to solving an MDP, we combine three different elements: a workflow, a context and a reward function, the latter expressing the metric we are interested in measuring. Note that this encoding is loosely inspired by the MDP encoding of access control mechanisms proposed in [19] .
Definition 3 (MDP Encoding). Given a workflow
, where given any pairs (c, t), (c , t ) ∈ C × T and any user u ∈ U:
5 For the sake of conciseness, we write p a ss for p(s, a, s ) when no confusion can arise.
A policy for MDP[W, D, r] is then a function δ : C × T → U, that is, a contextual assignment. In other words, the optimal policy δ * is the optimal contextual assignment for the workflow, the context description and the reward function. Since we focus on the non-violation of the security policy, we define the reward function associating each violation with −∞ for the context description D h : r p ((c, t) , u, (c , t )) = −∞ if t = ⊥ t and c, u, t p 0 otherwise.
where we assume that −∞ * 0 = 0, meaning that an −∞ reward on a transition that cannot happen has no effect on the overall value function. Note that by construction, we know that transitions starting from ⊥ t can only finish at ⊥ t , so we do not need to measure such transitions. Table 1 actually presents all possible instance for δ c in the running example. It is easy to see that this definition of the WSP matches the informal one given above: the optimal policy δ * avoids any transition reachable from (∅, t 0 ) with a reward of −∞, i.e., any transition that would violate the policy. So, as long as there is a possible assignment that allows the workflow to reach the task ⊥ t without violating the policy, the optimal policy will select it. It is also worth observing that this definition is binary: either V * (∅, t 0 ) = 0 or V * (∅, t 0 ) = −∞. We generalise it in Section 4, since the objective of this model is to go beyond binary satisfaction and resiliency.
Definition 4 (WSP). Given a workflow W = (U,
T , τ, t 0 , p), we write V * h for the optimal value function of MDP[W, D h , r p ], and we say that W is satisfiable if, and only if, V * h (∅, t 0 ) = 0. In the following, we usually write δ c for the optimal policy of MDP[W, D h , r p ], and
Implementation of the optimal policy
Solving an MDP is in general an intractable problem [5, 8] , because the optimal value function must be calculated on every possible state (and the WSP is shown to be NP-complete [23] ). Hence, we do not aim here to present an efficient solution to solve this problem, and we refer to e.g. [12] for recent work on the complexity of solving WSP.
Calculating all possible future states is equivalent to traversing a tree of all possible assignment paths outgoing from the current state. To help visualise this concept Figure 4 depicts an assignment tree where each complete path is equivalent to a valid workflow assignment given in Table 1 . A node c in the tree represents a context such that c i at level j represents a state (c i , t j ). A leaf node is the workflow finish point ⊥ t . All outgoing edges from c i at level j define the set of users P U ci,tj from which one is selected. Essentially, δ c ensures all assignments are made within the bounds of an assignment tree composed of assignment paths which all finish with ⊥ t . It follows that in any state, any user selected from PU c,t will allow the workflow to complete. We present in Section 5 an implementation of the optimal policy using Value Iteration under simplifying assumptions. 
Quantitative Satisfaction
In general, the fact alone that a workflow is unsatisfiable is, as such, of little help for a system designer. Consider for instance a workflow where all but one instance can be correctly assigned, and another where no instance can be correctly assigned. Both workflows are unsatisfiable, however, on average, the first one provides a better service than the second one. In addition, if both workflows terminate early instead of violating the policy, they are both better than a workflow violating the policy. Of course, a satisfiable workflow is always better than an unsatisfiable one, but as said in the Introduction, we aim at providing tools and quantitative measures for concrete situations, where the ideal case is not always reachable. In order to model the early termination of a workflow, given a workflow W = (U, T , τ, t 0 , p) with the context D h , we introduce a special user ⊥ u ∈ U, such that τ (t, ⊥ u ) = ⊥ t , for any task t. In order to reward successful termination we provide a positive reward for such successful completion, and we associate a null reward for the early termination:
We are then able to provide a probabilistic statement about satisfiability.
Definition 5. Given a workflow W = (U, T , τ, t 0 , p) we define the quantitative satisfaction of W by V
The quantitative satisfaction of a workflow is either −∞, if the workflow is not satisfiable, or a number between 0 and 1, indicating the probability of the workflow to finish, based on the probabilistic task manager. In particular, it is easy to prove the following proposition, following a similar reasoning to that matching Definition 4 with the informal description of the WSP.
Proposition 1. Given a workflow W , W is satisfiable if, and only if its quantitative satisfaction is equivalent to 1.
Note that we cannot define the quantitative satisfaction to be equal to 1, which is only possible if β = 1, which is forbidden, by definition. In practice, if there is no infinite loop in the MDP (as it is the case in Section 5), this factor can be equal to 1. The proof of Proposition 1 is quite straight-forward: in order to obtain V * s (∅, t 0 ) = 1, the optimal policy must be able to assign each task to a user without violating the policy nor terminating early.
Quantitative Resiliency
Wang and Li define in [23] resiliency as a "property of those system configurations that can satisfy the workflow even with absence of some users". As described in the Introduction, there are indeed multiple scenarios where users can fail at some point, thus not being able to execute an assigned task. Hence, a user-task assignment might need to take into account such failures.
Several levels of resiliency are introduced in [23] : static resiliency, where users can only fail before the start of the workflow; decremental resiliency, where users can fail during the workflow, and cannot become available again; and dynamic resiliency, where users can fail and later become available during the workflow.
Let us first observe that the notion of static resiliency does not require any special encoding, since checking for it can be done by directly checking the WSP for the workflow without the failing users. We now focus on the decremental and dynamic resiliency. We consider the set of contexts C f,N = {f ⊆ U | |f | ≤ N }, where each context c ∈ C f,N corresponds to a set of at most N users not available. For any user u and task t, an assignment (u, t) satisfies p if u is available, hence for any context c ∈ C f,N , we write c, u, t p if, and only if, u ∈ c.f . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each user has the same probability of failing (although this could clearly be easily generalised), and given a context c, the set of all possible next contexts is defined as:
In particular, when the size of c is already equal to N , then nf N (c) = {c}. We can then define the probability of reaching a new context c from a context c from the user failure perspective: We write D f,N = (C f,N , γ f,N , ∅) for the context description corresponding to the decremental and equiprobable failure of up to N users, and we write D h,f,N = D h × D f,N for the cartesian product of this context description and the one modelling previous assignments, where the context manager is defined in a pointwise way, and reward functions applies to the relevant components of a tuple 6 . For any context c ∈ C h,f,N , user u and task t, an assignment (u, t) satisfies p, and we write c, u, t p, if, and only if, c ∪ {(u, t)} p ∧ u ∈ c.f . In the following, we usually write δ s for the optimal policy of MDP[W, D h,f,N , r s ]. Note that we sum over all possible contexts, because the notion of decremental resiliency also considers that users can fail before the start of the execution of the workflow. In addition, dynamic resiliency can be encoded similarly by defining nf N (c) = C f,N , and we therefore focus only in the rest of the paper on decremental resiliency, unless specified otherwise. Running example. Consider now a different security policy p 2 = (P 2 , S 2 , B 2 ), where P 2 = {(u 1 , t 1 ), (u 2 , t 1 ), (u 2 , t 2 ), (u 3 , t 2 ), (u 4 , t 2 ), (u 1 , t 3 ), (u 3 , t 3 )}, B 2 = ∅ and S 2 = {{t 1 , t 2 }, {t 1 , t 3 }}. A label <u i > denotes u i has failed. Figure 5 illustrates how δ s can maximise the quantitative resiliency of the running example for two failed users. Assigning t 1 to u 2 generates two assignment options for t 2 . In turn, selecting u 3 for the assignment of t 2 ensures two assignment options for t 3 . Despite the failure of u 4 at t 2 and u 1 at t 3 , the workflow can terminate. Figure 6 illustrates how the workflow can still fail under δ s due to an unavoidable block caused by two failed users. User u 1 must be assigned t 1 following the failure of u 2 . Two assignment options are available at t 2 from which either can be chosen but due to the failure of u 3 at t 3 , the workflow is blocked.
Expected Distance
The quantitative satisfaction of a workflow denotes the probability of a workflow to terminate, taking the context into account. This metric therefore does not
differentiate between an instance terminating at the first task and an instance terminating at the penultimate task. In order to illustrate the flexibility of our model, we define the expected distance of the workflow, i.e., the number of tasks performed before terminating, using the following reward function, defined over the context description D h :
The expected distance of the workflow can therefore be calculated with
We can also redefine the notion of resiliency to measure the expected distance instead of the success rate with the optimal value function of MDP[W, D h,f,N , r d ], and we usually write δ d for the optimal policy of this model. Interestingly, an assignment optimal for the notion of resiliency as defined in Section 4.2 is not necessarily optimal for this notion of resiliency, as illustrated in Section 5. This reinforces our motivation for building the model presented here, which can provide several metrics and thus help a system designer to improve or fix a workflow, rather than a simple boolean indicating whether the workflow is satisfiable or not.
Running example. Figure 7 illustrates how δ d can optimize the expected distance of our running example for two failed users. Following the failure of u 3 and u 4 at t 1 , u 1 is assigned t 1 to generate the assignment option u 2 at t 2 . Task t 2 can be assigned before the workflow blocks at t 3 . In contrast, δ s would always finish at t 1 while δ o and δ c would assign either u 1 or u 2 at t 1 resulting in the workflow finishing at either t 2 or t 3 . Figure 8 illustrates how δ d can lower the expected distance for two failed users. The failure of u 4 means t 1 must be assigned to u 1 to optimise the distance-resiliency at that point. The failure of u 3 at t 3 means the workflow is now blocked. However, under δ s , t 1 would be assigned to t 2 which reduces the assignment options for t 2 to just u 3 but increases the options for the final task t 3 to u 1 and u 3 . It follows that the workflow would complete with this particular failure under δ s .
Algorithm 1
Value Iteration for the optimal value function, where c.h refers to the history of previous assignments in the context c.
if t = ⊥t then RS 3:
else if c, u, t p then RV 4:
if u = ⊥u then 0 7:
end if 10: end function
Assessment
In this section, we give an empirical assessment of the different policies introduced in Sections 3 and 4. More precisely, given a uniform distribution of user failure, we are able to generate resiliency metrics for a workflow and show the average success rate appears higher using the resiliency assignments δ s and δ d .
Implementation
We solve the MDP defined in Section 3 using value iteration [5] and implement a simplified version of the optimal policy function δ * under the assumption that user failures are equiprobable and workflow behaviour is linear, i.e., no loops or branches exist. Given a context c, a task t, a discount factor β and a reward vector R = (R S , R T , R V ), corresponding to the atomic rewards for successfully terminating, doing one step and violating the policy, respectively, the optimal policy is given as:
where Q * is defined in Algorithm 1. We are now in position to define the policies introduced in Section 3 and Section 4. Given c ∈ C h , c ∈ C h,f,N and t ∈ T
Note that since we assume the workflow is linear, we can safely assign 1 to β. As δ c and δ s concern themselves with optimising workflow satisfaction it is possible to carry out a degree of pre-processing before runtime. Assignments with reward −∞ can be removed offline as they clearly do not contribute to the satisfiability of a workflow. All correct assignments are therefore cached in a tree data structure. Any unavailable users are removed before selecting a user for the current assignment. If multiple users are found to be optimal by any of the four policies, one is simply selected at random. To model user failure, all possible user failures are generated up to N as a set of failure vectors. The test program takes as input parameters a sequence of tasks, a security policy, a set of users, a single failure vector and an assignment policy. Before assigning each task, the failure vector is checked and users removed as appropriate. A call is made to the given assignment policy for each task in turn and the result logged in an assignment history. The program terminates if the end of the workflow is reached or no assignment can be made and outputs the assignment history and assignment time which is the aggregation of computation time captured through a benchmarking library. For instance, we define Example 1 to contain 10 tasks, 6 users and a security policy consisting 10 separation and 2 binding of duty constraints. We consider 1 user failure per run giving 61 failure vectors in all, each run 10 times. The testing was done on a computing platform incorporating a 2.40Ghz i5 Intel processor and 4GB RAM.
Results A total of 610 runs were recorded per policy. It should be noted that 150 correct assignments exist for the workflow instance in Example 1. The recorded test data has been analysed and the primary results presented in Table 2 . To aid understanding, the sample data is also presented in graphical form. Figure 9 shows the probability of assignment for each task in Example 1. For example, the probability of the workflow to execute until at least t 3 using δ o is 0.49 while under δ c the probability is 0.95. The workflow success rate is equivalent to the probability of reaching t 10 . Figure 10 gives average computation time (excluding pre-computed data, such as the assignment tree). For example, the average time to compute assignments up to and including t 4 under δ o is 111µs while under δ c the time is 17.2µs. Table 3 summarises the different characteristics of the different policies. As expected, δ s generates assignments providing the highest success rate, and δ d generates assignments giving the highest expected distance. Intuitively δ s reserves users for the final task assignments and δ d reserves users to ensure every task has the highest possibility of being assigned. Our results indicate choosing δ s to optimise success rate does not mean optimal expected distance will follow: since δ s is only concerned with reaching the finish point, it terminates once it knows failure is guaranteed, thus lowering expected distance achieved by other strategies. This phenomenon is seen in Figure 9 which gives the appearance of δ s striving straight to the finish point while δ c and δ d prioritise assigning tasks along the way. It is noticeable that average task assignment probabilities are raised when made within the bounds of an assignment tree used in δ c and δ s . However an observed side-effect of removing known bad assignments (with reward −∞) is to lower initial task assignment probabilities below that achieved by δ o and δ d . Figure 9 shows the probability to assign t 2 under δ s is 0.9 and δ c as 0.98, yet equals 1 under δ o and δ d . It follows that basing decisions solely on initial task assignments would indicate δ o , δ c and δ d are better then δ s , yet δ s is more likely to finish. Caution should be taken of this somewhat false impression, especially with δ o as performance can clearly drop suddenly. The behaviour of δ o can be attributed to bad assignments made with or without user failure, and a greedy nature of using up critical users for early tasks leaving more and more bad assignment options for later ones. If no bad assignments or user failures exist, δ o can expect to match the performance of δ c .
Discussion
The fastest computation time is achieved by δ c which is expected due to the least amount of runtime processing it must perform. Note that δ c uses the assignment tree data structure so does not need to calculate correct task assignments at runtime, nor does it calculate any aspect of resiliency; only the current failed users must be removed. This runtime performance does come with the cost of calculating all correct assignments offline and generating the data tree structure (17.39s for Example 1); the time for this grows exponentially with the number of tasks and users. It follows that timings for each strategy increase with the amount of runtime processing performed. As expected, the slowest strategy δ d has the heaviest runtime workload, i.e. calculating correct assignments and calculating a resiliency value for each potential task assignment.
To summarise, none of the four policies we have introduced guarantee a full success rate and we do not suggest one is the outright best in terms of optimising workflow satisfaction and resiliency. Optimising success can lower distance while optimising time can lower resiliency for example. These tensions are heavily dependent on the nature of the workflow, the security policy and which users fail and at what point they fail. The results we have presented give a first step in the generation of useable metrics indicating the success rate, expected distance, computation time and task-assignment probabilities of workflow assignments. These values give a more meaningful measure than previous work and make it easier to compare workflow assignments in terms of how much satisfiability and resiliency they can give. Clearly the establishment of an acceptable workflow is a case of security and business trade-offs. Favouring one measure over another will depend on workflow priorities, i.e., whether the only concern is to finish or instead be confident that a certain point will be reached, or does computation time outweigh the need for resiliency? This decision can become crucial due to tension we have shown existing between these aspects. Providing suitable metrics and tools for workflow designers would facilitate more informed decisions regarding these concerns.
Running Example In addition, two sets of results for the running example used throughout this paper are given in Table 4 . The first, Example 2 are generated using policy p 1 defined in Section 3.1, and second, Example 3 using policy p 2 defined in Section 4.2. A maximum of 2 user failures is considered totalling 67 equiprobable failures, each run 10 times per assignment policy. The testing for Example 2 was carried out on a computing platform incorporating a 2.40Ghz i5 Intel processor, and for Example 3, a 2.3GHz Intel duo-core processor, both with 4GB RAM.
Conclusion
We have presented in this paper a Markov Decision Process (MDP) encoding of the workflow satisfaction and resiliency problem. We have therefore reduced the problem of finding optimal user-task assignment to that of solving an MDP, which is a well studied problem. One of the main strengths of our approach is to provide a very flexible approach, where a simple modification of the context or the reward function provides a new metric to analyse a workflow. We believe that by addressing the workflow satisfaction and resiliency problem from a quantitative viewpoint rather than from a binary one, we provide tools and metrics that can be helpful for a workflow designer to analyse all those cases that are neither satisfiable nor resilient ideally, but need to work nevertheless. We have illustrated that the analysis of a workflow is multi-dimensional, and that there is a trade-off to be established, among others, between computation time, success rate and expected distance. Clearly, other dimensions can be taken into account, such that the possibility to dynamically modify the security policy [4] , or perhaps the possibility to override the security constraints [22] .
For future work, an interesting point is to develop the tools to help the system designer fix a given workflow, using different metrics. For instance, a set of workflow modifications proven to be monotonic with the quantitative satisfaction or with the decremental resiliency could be a very helpful tool, especially in the context of structured workflow design, e.g., with business processes. Another lead is the study of sub-optimal policies. Indeed, calculating a sub-optimal solution might be more tractable [8] , at the cost of a loss of accuracy. In this case, it could be worth understanding the impact on the WSP of using a sub-optimal solution.
